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JURISDICTION 
This case involves a second degree felony and a writ for 
extraordinary relief; therefore, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e)7 (f) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the 
Petition as frivolous, when the trial court failed to comply with the 
majority of the requirements in Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
The standard of review, since the matter presents questions 
of law, is that no deference is accorded to the trial court's 
conclusions. The conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Stewart 
v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Casida v. Deland, 
866 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136, 
138 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . See also, State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (appellate courts review conclusions of law under 
non-deferential correctness of error standard when the facts are 
undisputed.) The facts should not be in dispute in this case. 
II. Whether the lower court misinterpreted the case law in 
ruling that the Petition was barred for failure to file a direct 
appeal. 
The same standard of review applies: The errors are 
questions of law which are reviewed by the Court for correctness, 
requiring no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Gerrish v. 
Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Statutes, rules and cases which are determinative of the 
respective issues include the following: Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule 11(5) ; Rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-13-6, 76-6-4 04; and the 
United States Supreme Court decisions in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 243-44 (1969); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the July 14, 1997, ruling by Judge Jon 
M. Memmott of the Second District Court, denying Appellant's pro se 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Vacate Conviction. The Court 
ruled that the Petition was frivolous on its face and dismissed said 
Petition pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(5). 
The Petition, which was filed pro se by Mark Anthony Duran, 
aka Mark Anthony Bresqko (hereinafter "Duran" or "Appellant"), raises 
numerous constitutional infirmities in his guilty plea of July 27, 
1982, to the second degree felony charge of theft, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404. Appellant entered a guilty plea pursuant to an oral plea 
agreement, in which a third degree felony count was dismissed. 
The transcript shows the guilty plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. The Court did not comply with Rule 11(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court failed to establish 
a factual basis for the crime, that Appellant obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over another's vehicle with the intent to 
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permanently deprive the owner of said property. The Court did not 
explain the nature and elements of the crime to Appellant. No 
statement in advance of plea or plea affidavit was used to explain the 
elements of the crime or the constitutional rights to Appellant. 
The Court failed to ascertain and obtain from the Appellant 
a waiver of his constitutional rights pertaining to: his presumption 
of innocence, the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in open court, and 
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. The Court 
did not inform Appellant of the minimum and maximum sentence for such 
a felony. 
The Court failed to advise Appellant of any right to 
withdraw his guilty plea, or the time frame in which to withdraw such 
a plea. 
Duran claims the trial court erred in failing to comply with 
Rule 11 and by not ensuring that the guilty plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. The lower court's denial of said Petition as 
frivolous is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. In the 
alternative, this Court should remand the case for further proceedings 
in the Second District Court. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Duran was charged in the Second District Court with second 
and third degree felonies. On July 27, 1982, he entered a guilty plea 
to theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree felony. Despite a Rule 
402 Motion to reduce the charge to a third degree felony, Duran was 
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sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. Duran has 
served and completed that sentence. However, Duran is still suffering 
the consequences of said conviction inasmuch as he is incarcerated in 
the Limon Correctional Facility in the State of Colorado. Based in 
part upon the second degree felony conviction from the Second District 
Court, Duran has been sentenced to a life sentence as an habitual 
criminal in the State of Colorado with a parole eligibility date only 
after serving 40 years. Without the conviction from the Second 
District Court, Duran would not be subjected to punishment as a 
habitual criminal. 
Duran did not file a direct appeal of the 1982 judgment and 
conviction. 
FINAL DISPOSITION 
On or about October 4, 1994, a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief to Vacate Judgment was filed. The court's final ruling denying 
said Petition was entered on or about July 14, 1997. Duran filed a 
timely appeal thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellant was charged in the Second District Court with 
theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 76-4-412(1) (a) (ii) . Appellant entered a guilty plea 
on July 27, 1982, pursuant to an oral plea agreement in which another 
felony count was dismissed. (See transcript, attached hereto as 
Addendum (hereinafter "Add." at 24-32.) The trial court refers to the 
charge as "theft," and not theft of a motor vehicle. 
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2. No statement in advance of plea or plea affidavit was 
used to explain the elements of the crime or the constitutional rights 
to Appellant. Add. at 25-31. 
3. The transcript shows the guilty plea was not knowingly 
and voluntarily entered. The court did not comply with Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Add. at 25-31. 
4. The trial court failed to establish a factual basis for 
the theft, that Appellant obtained or exercised unauthorized control 
over another's vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the 
owner of said property. The court did not explain the nature and 
elements of the crime to Appellant. Add. at 25-31. 
5. The court failed to ascertain and obtain from the 
Appellant a waiver of his constitutional rights pertaining to: the 
right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses in open court, and the right to 
compel the attendance of defense witnesses. Add. at 25-31. 
6. The court did not inform Appellant of the minimum and 
maximum sentence for such a felony. Add. at 25-31. 
7. The court failed to advise Appellant of any right to 
withdraw his guilty plea, or the time frame in which to withdraw such 
a plea. Add. at 25-31. 
8. Plaintiff's Petition for Post Conviction Relief to 
Vacate Conviction was denied by the Court on July 14, 1997. Pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(b) (7) , said Petition was dismissed 
as frivolous on its face. Add. at 33-36. Appellant then timely 
appealed said dismissal. 
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9. Appellant is incarcerated in the Limon Correctional 
Facility in Colorado on a life sentence as an habitual criminal. He 
must serve 4 0 years before being eligible for parole. If the 
conviction from the Second District Court is set aside, Appellant will 
not be subject to the 40-year commitment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court committed plain error in dismissing 
Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to Vacate Conviction 
as frivolous. This Court should reverse the lower court's dismissal 
on the basis of manifest error. 
The trial court's total disregard for Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting the guilty plea requires 
reversal. The transcript of said plea colloquy shows that the plea 
was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that the basic due 
process requirements of Rule 11 were ignored. The court failed to 
explain the elements of the second degree felony charge of theft to 
Duran. There was no factual basis for said plea. Duran was never 
informed of his right to withdraw the guilty plea. The court never 
informed Duran of the minimum and maximum sentence for such a felony. 
The lower court, in dismissing the Petition as frivolous, 
did not deal with the significant constitutional violations of Duran's 
rights during the change of plea hearing. Instead, the court 
mistakenly found that by entering his guilty plea, Duran had admitted 
all essential elements of the crime and waived all normal 
jurisdictional effects. See Ruling, Add. at 34. The court further 
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found that the Petition could not be granted because Duran failed to 
file a direct appeal. Add. at 34. 
The court's findings are not consistent with the 
overwhelming case law that such obvious unconstitutional convictions 
can be addressed through collateral attacks at any time. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Clearly Violated Appellants 
Constitutional Rights By Failing To Comply With Rule 11(e) Of The Utah 
Rules Of Criminal Procedure When Accepting His Guilty Plea. 
The facts in this case are undisputed. All of the pertinent 
facts are contained in the transcript of the July 27, 1982 change of 
plea hearing. See Add. at 24-32. At the time the Second Judicial 
District Court accepted Appellant's guilty plea to the second degree 
felony of theft of a motor vehicle, it did not establish that said 
guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The record shows 
Appellant's due process rights were violated at said hearing. 
Appellant's constitutional rights were violated when the 
trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which states: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, 
the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
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(4) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right 
of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest 
or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the 
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), (f). 
The transcript shows obvious violations of subparagraphs 
(2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of Rule 11(e). The major violations 
included not establishing the plea was voluntary, not explaining the 
nature and elements of offense to Duran, not explaining minimum and 
maximum sentences, including the possibility of consecutive sentences, 
not advising Duran of his right to file a motion to withdraw his plea, 
and not explaining the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
Various cases support Appellant's position that such total 
failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea fatally flawed. 
See, State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 
1123-24 (Utah 1991); Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969); 
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); McCarthy v. United States, 
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394 U.S. 459 (1969) . When the guilty plea has been accepted in 
violation of Rule 11, the case should be remanded to give the 
defendant a chance to plea anew. McCarthy, 3 94 U.S. at 492. 
Duran's limited plea colloquy clearly establishes that the 
court failed to comply with Rule 11(e) . Although the current standard 
requiring strict adherence to Rule 11(e) was not established until 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the trial court's inquiry 
fails miserably under any test, particularly the "record as a whole" 
test. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P. 2d 1278 (Utah 1988) . The test in 1982 required a 
showing that the court had substantially complied with the 
constitutional and procedural requirements. State v. Stilling, 856 
P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
A. The Plea Was Not Knowingly And Voluntarily Entered. 
"A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in 
order to protect a defendant's due process rights." State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)). When the court 
significantly departs from constitutional and procedural requirements 
it creates doubt as to the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty 
plea. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671. The determination of whether there 
has been substantial compliance with these requirements turns on the 
facts of the individual case. Id. 
Courts have typically looked at the affidavit which is 
signed during the change of plea hearing and the plea colloquy to 
determine if the defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
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entered. "The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, 
but an affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point, 
in the pleading process." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. 
The trial court may not rely on either defense counsel or 
affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e). State 
v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94. "Rather, with or without an 
affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the trial court must conduct 
an on-the-record review with defendant of the Rule 11 (e) 
requirements." Id. 
No affidavit or statement in advance of plea was used during 
Duran's July 27, 1982, hearing. Although the lack of an affidavit 
does not render the plea involuntary, it does force the court to 
review all of defendant's constitutional rights during the plea 
colloquy. In this case, the trial court failed to explain the 
consequences of his plea, did not ascertain whether Duran understood 
the nature and elements of the theft charge, did not determine whether 
there was a factual basis for the plea, failed to explain the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to compel the attendance 
of defense witnesses, and did not explain the right to withdraw the 
guilty plea. See Rule ll(e); Add. at 25-31. 
The plea colloquy clearly was "materially and fatally 
defective" in a number of ways. State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 646, 648 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) . The information provided to Duran at said 
hearing is a stark contrast to the plea colloquy in State v. Parsons, 
781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989), in which the court stated, "It is 
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clear from the record that great care was taken to ascertain the 
voluntariness of his plea." 
Appellant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered 
when there was no written affidavit or statement in advance of plea 
and the only information provided to Appellant regarding his 
constitutional rights was the brief plea colloquy with the court, 
which ignored the basic due process requirements of Rule 11. 
"It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the 
trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative 
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." Boykin v. Alabama, 
394 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969). 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Explain The Nature, Elements of The Crime. 
The plea colloquy shows that the trial court did not comply 
with Rule 11(e) (4) , which requires a finding that Duran understood the 
nature and elements of the offense. 
The type of brief, conclusory inquiry posed by Duran7 s trial 
judge has been frowned upon by the courts. See, State v. Valencia, 
IIS P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The defendant's 
"understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship of 
the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete 
examination." Id. at 1335. 
A guilty plea cannot be "knowing" when defendant does not 
"understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship 
of the law to the facts." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. 
[T] he factual elements of the charges against the defendant 
must be explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that 
the defendant understands and admits those elements: 
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[B] ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all of the 
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly 
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding 
of the law in relation to the facts... 
The judge must determine "that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense included therein to 
which the defendant has pleaded guilty...." 
Id. at 1313. 
The court did not explain to Duran the elements of the 
felony theft charge. To be found guilty of theft, the elements 
require that the defendant exercise or obtain unauthorized control 
over the property of another with the purpose of permanently depriving 
him of said property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-401(3), 404. Further, 
the court did not establish a factual basis for the alleged motor 
vehicle theft. The court's attempt to explain the elements and 
establish a factual basis was limited to the following: 
THE COURT: What was your involvement in this and just the part 
of Count Two? 
MR. DURAN: Just riding out to Bountiful. That's it. 
THE COURT: Oh, what was taken? 
MR. DURAN: From the car? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Theft, a felony of the second 













It's a car? 
Right 
You were with somebody else, is that it? 
Yes, sir. 
Both of you did it together; is that correct? 
Yes, sir. 
Where were you going to go with the car? 
Out to Bountiful. 
Where did you take the car, from what city? 
Salt Lake. 
Transcript of July 27, 1982, hearing; Add. at 29-30. 
The decision in State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983) , supports Duran's position that the above-quoted element/factual 
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colloquy was constitutionally lacking. After analyzing the plea 
colloquy, the court in Breckenridge concluded that the defendant did 
not understand the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled 
guilty. The court stated that the transcript recited "no factual 
basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever occurred." Id. 
at 443. The court stated that the essential element of arson, that 
a person intentionally damaged property, had not been shown. Id. 
In the instant case, the transcript shows that the court 
never outlined the elements of theft of a motor vehicle and never 
established by Duran's admissions or otherwise that he exercised 
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle with the purpose of 
permanently depriving the owner of said vehicle. Duran's statements 
to the court, that he was "just riding out to Bountiful," that he did 
"it" with "somebody else," and that they travelled from Salt Lake to 
Bountiful, fail to establish the crucial element of Duran's intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of said vehicle. Add. at 29-30. 
Intent is such a crucial element that failure to address it 
requires reversal. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), a 
plea to second degree murder was deemed involuntary where the 
defendant was not informed that the intent to cause the victim' s death 
was an element of the crime. 
Duran's admissions, which more closely describe the offense 
of joy riding, fail to establish the required factual basis for the 
alleged theft. In fact, it would appear from the court's colloquy 
that it was not even aware that the theft involved a vehicle. At one 
point, the court asked, "What was taken?" Duran responded, "From the 
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car?" The trial court then responded, "Well, I don't know," and then 
made a brief and ineffective attempt to describe the theft. Add. at 
29-30. Since the court obviously was confused about the charges, it 
is logical to conclude that Duran did not understand the nature and 
elements of the offense. 
Appellant did not have the luxury of a written affidavit or 
statement in advance of plea. The only information he had pertaining 
to his constitutional rights was what the court provided to him during 
the plea colloquy. Therefore, even when this Court considers the 
"record as a whole, " it is obvious the record fails to pass 
constitutional muster. The record seemingly mandates a reversal for 
a blatant violation of Appellant's rights. See, Willett v. Barnes, 
842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992). The court's failure to comply with 
Rule 11 and satisfy itself there was a factual basis for the 
defendant's plea is not deemed harmless error. See, United States v. 
Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988). 
The judge must determine "that the conduct which the 
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the 
indictment or information or an offense included therein to 
which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Requiring this 
examination of the relation between the law and the acts 
the defendant admits having committed is designed to 
"protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading 
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the 
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not 
actually fall within the charge." 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). 
C. The Record Does Not Establish A Factual Basis For The Plea. 
The court cannot be satisfied that a guilty plea is knowing 
and voluntary unless the record establishes facts that would place the 
defendant at risk of conviction should the matter proceed to trial. 
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Willett, 842 P.2d at 862. This requirement "has been described as the 
need for a factual basis for the plea." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 
666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In Willett, the defendant filed a writ 
of habeas corpus to set aside his guilty plea to first degree murder. 
The court held that the trial court failed to establish a factual 
basis for the guilty plea. The following plea colloquy was found to 
be insufficient to establish said factual basis: 
MR. WATSON: Perhaps the court would want to inquire 
whether or not there is a factual basis from this 
particular defendant with regard to the entry of this plea 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Suppose you state for the court briefly Mr. 
Willett how exactly it happened on the 20th of November? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Well, I aided and abetted my father. 
THE COURT: In doing what? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: In the commission of killing Mr. Dan 
Okleberry. 
THE COURT: I suppose that is adequate Mr. Watson. 
Willett, 842 P.2d at 861-62. 
When this Court compares the plea colloquy in Willett with 
the trial court's colloquy with Duran, it is clear that Duran's rights 
also were seriously violated. There is no way that Duran's guilty 
plea was entered based upon a sufficient factual basis. 
D. One Of The Most Glaring Errors Was The Court's Failure To 
Inform Duran Of The Consequences Of His Plea. 
One of the most glaring errors committed by the trial court 
was its total disregard for Rule 11(e) (5) , which states that the court 
must find that the "defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences." 
The record of the plea colloquy is conspicuously absent in 
any reference to a minimum or maximum sentence which could be imposed 
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upon Duran for the second degree felony. The court never mentions 
that Duran could be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate sentence of 1 to 15 years for a second degree felony. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant 
must be "fully aware of the direct consequences" of the plea. See. 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) . 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements 
are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis 
for that duty is found in Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-12, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), 
where the United States Supreme Court stated: "What is at 
stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost 
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
consequence." 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d, 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court neglected to inform Duran of the full 
consequences of his plea, "namely, the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences." State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The court 
was fully informed that Appellant was being sentenced on unrelated 
charges on August 18, 1982, just one week prior to the August 24, 
1982, sentencing on the motor vehicle theft. Add. at 31. The plea 
colloquy lacks any reference to the possibility of Duran's sentence 
running concurrently or consecutively with any other charges. 
E. The Trial Court Never Informed Duran Of His Right To Withdraw 
The Guilty Plea. 
Rule 11(e) (7) requires the court to advise defendant of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea. A review of 
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the transcript shows the trial court made no reference to Duran having 
any right to withdraw his guilty plea. Add. at 25-31. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 governs the withdrawal of guilty 
pleas. At the time Duran entered his plea in 1982, § 77-13-6(2) read: 
"A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of court." § 77-13-6(2) (1980) ; State 
v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) . The statute was amended in 
1989 to add the requirement that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
must be made within 3 0 days after entry of said plea. Abeyta, 852 at 
995. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987), the 
court noted that the statutory provision governing the withdrawal of 
the guilty plea sets no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw 
said plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1980) . 
Under the statute in place in 1982, Duran simply must show 
"good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea. The numerous constitutional 
infirmities outlined throughout this Brief clearly establish good 
cause. 
The court's failure to advise Duran of the time limits for 
filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea is not grounds to set the 
plea aside, but "may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). Therefore, 
although the pro se Petition may not have specifically requested to 
withdraw the guilty plea, Duran requests that if this case is remanded 
to the Second District Court that he be permitted to file a formal 
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motion to withdraw his guilty plea at that time. It is an abuse of 
discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the 
defendant did not have full knowledge and understanding of the 
consequences of his plea. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95. 
There is no question that Duran's constitutional rights were 
violated at the time the trial court accepted his guilty plea. Any 
of the enumerated errors listed above are sufficient grounds to grant 
said Petition. The court did not take the required steps to ensure 
that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that Duran 
had consciously waived his numerous constitutional rights. 
II. The Lower Court Misinterpreted The Case Law In Ruling 
That The Petition Was Barred For Failure To File A Direct Appeal. 
In dismissing the Petition as frivolous, the lower court 
cited two cases which stand for the proposition that this Petition 
could not be granted because Duran had not exercised his rights in 
filing a direct appeal. See Ruling, Add. at 34. 
However, one of the cases cited by the court, Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994), supports Duran's position that 
his Petition is a proper means to attack the constitutional 
infirmities of his guilty plea. "Habeas relief is available where a 
defendant has suffered 'obvious injustice' or 'substantial and 
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.'" Id. at 519. The 
court stated that normally such petitions are no substitute for 
appellate review and such issues should be raised on direct appeal. 
"However, where 'unusual circumstances are present to justify the 
failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, a court may entertain 
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such a claim raised for the first time in the habeas corpus 
petition.'" Id. The court in Parsons, even without a showing of 
unusual circumstances, went on to consider the merits of the 
constitutional arguments. Id. 
Duran has met the "unusual circumstances" test. The plea 
colloquy ignored the Rule 11(e) requirements to such an extent that 
the injustice is obvious. The failure to inform Duran of his right 
to withdraw the guilty plea, the minimum and maximum sentence, 
including consecutive sentences, and the nature and elements of the 
felony, are such substantial and prejudicial constitutional violations 
that they satisfy the exception to the general rule. 
Duran's argument that his Petition is not only timely but 
raises significant constitutional issues is enhanced by the fact that 
the trial court never informed him of his right to withdraw a guilty 
plea or to file any appeal related thereto. See hearing transcript, 
Add. at 24-32. 
Since Duran had not been represented by counsel until the 
filing of this appeal, he should not be held to the same stringent 
pleading standards as if he had been represented by counsel. Haines 
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) . Duran apparently did not file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but if this Court remands the case 
for further proceedings in the Second District Court, he should be 
permitted to file a motion at that time. 
Since Duran is facing 4 0 years as an habitual criminal in 
the State of Colorado, based upon the enhancements which include the 
prior 1982 conviction from the Second District Court, the argument 
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that this Court should consider the constitutional validity of such 
a prior conviction is even stronger. For example, under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (hereinafter "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a 
defendant who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a fire 
arm receives an enhanced sentence of at least 15 years if he has three 
prior convictions for a serious drug offense or a violent felony. 
Courts must consider constitutional challenges to the validity of 
prior convictions under the ACCA. The present use of a prior 
conviction in a sense renews the constitutional violation and requires 
that present constitutional standards be applied. United States v. 
Burt, 802 F.2d 330, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1986); see also, Hart v. Risley, 
585 F.Supp. 269, 273 (D. Mont. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 
1985), cert, denied, (1985); State v. Holsworth, 607 P.2d 845, 848-49 
(Wash. 1980). 
The case law under the ACCA clearly permits constitutional 
challenges to the validity of prior convictions. These cases 
strengthen Duran's position that the lower court's cursory dismissal 
of his Petition without addressing the merits of the significant 
constitutional errors was totally inappropriate. 
The availability of the transcript of the plea colloquy from 
1982 provides further evidence that Duran's Petition should not be 
summarily dismissed. In State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 646 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), the court upheld the dismissal of a motion to withdraw guilty 
plea which was brought 12 years after the conviction. However, a 
crucial factor in the court's decision was that the transcript no 
longer was available. Id. at 648. Duran has provided a full 
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transcript for the Court's review, and there is no reason not to 
address the Petition on its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and grant the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to 
Vacate Conviction. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the 
lower court's Ruling and remand for further proceedings in the Second 
District Court. If necessary, Duran should be permitted to file a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 1997. 
David W. Brown 
Attorney for Appellant 
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1 _ MR. JONES: Judge, we have the Duran matter and 
2 that may be disposed of summarily. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it. State of Utah 
4 versus Mark Anthony Duran, 3967. All right. Your date of 
5 birth is September 20, 1961; is that correct? 
6 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Record can show that the defendant is 
8 present, m the court with counsel. Who is going to speak? 
9 MR. VANDEKLINDEN: If I could, briefly, your 
10 Honor. This is a negotiated plea. There are two Counts 
11 against Mr. Duran. Count One is a Third Degree Felony. 
12 Count Two is a Second Degree Felony. On behalf of the Stat 
13 I have agreed to dismiss Count One, a Third Degree Felony, 
14 in return for Mr. Duran pleading guilty to Count Two, a 
15 Second Degree Felony. 
16 Also, I would not resist the 402 Motion if made b 
17 Mr. Jones. 
18 MR. JONES: That is correct, Judge. 
1? THE COURT: Mr. Duran, you understand this 
20 negotiated plea that has been stated to the Court today? 
21 MR. DURAN: About the 402 Motion? 
22 THE COURT: About the whole thing. 
23 MR. DURAN: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: First, you understand they are savin' 
25 we will dismiss Count One if Mr. Duran will plead guilty t 
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1 Count Two. Do you understand that? 
2 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: And you are willing to do that; is 
4 that correct? 
5 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: And then counsel has said that I may 
7 make a motion at the time of sentencing to reduce the Second 
8 Degree Felony that you are going to plead guilty to ;» Thir'1 
9 Degree Felony. 
0 MR. DURAN: Yes., sir. 
1 THE COURT: He is going to make that motion, but 
2 you understand the Court is not obligated to grant the 
3 motion. In other words, I could sentence you as a Second 
4 Degree Felony if you enter a plea of guilty today. Do you 
5 understand that? 
6 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: Are you agreeable to enter a plea on 
8 that kind of basis? 
9 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
0 THE COURT: Counsel, have you explained the 
1 charges to him as it would be on the negotiated plea? 
2 MR. JONES: Yes, I have, Judge. 
3 THE COURT: Are you satisfied that he understands 
4 his constitutional rights? 
5 MR. JONES: Yes, I am, Judge. 
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THE COURT: Are you satisfied itfs voluntary, 
knowing and understanding the plea that he is going to be 
making? 
MR. JONES: Yes, sir, Judge. 
THE COURT: Do you know of any reason why he 
should not plead guilty today? 
HR. JONES: No, sir, Judge. 
THE COURT: Directing the questions to you, Mr. 
Duran. Are you currently under the influence of alcohol 01 
drugs? 
HR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you currently being treated for 
any physical disability or mental illness? 
HR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you ever been treated for a 
mental disability? 
MR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand certain rights that y< 
have that you will be waiving by pleading guilty. Do you 
understand? 
MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: There won't be a trial either before-
court or before a jury. Do you understand that? 
MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You have a right: normally against 
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1 self-incrimination. You waive that by pleading guilty. Do 
2 you understand that? 
3 MR. DURAM: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: As a matter of fact, by pleading 
5 guilty, that becomes a judicial confession to the offense c 
6 theft, a felony of the second degree. Do you understand 
7 that? 
8 MR. DURAK: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Where the State normally nan .-•:> 
10 obligation to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
11 they then have no duty at all to prove anything. Do you 
12 understand that? 
13 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
14 THE COURT: A plea of guilty affects your right t 
15 appeal, although you still have a right to appeal 30 days 
16 after entering sentence if you want to. Do you understand 
17 that? 
18 MR. DURAH: What was that, sir? 
19 THE COURT: A plea of guilty affects your 
20 likelihood of your winning on an appeal. Do you understan 
21 that? 
22 MR. DURAll: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice yc 
24 counsel has given you? 
25 MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
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THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to 
ask him before we proceed further? 
MR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Have any promises been made to you as 
to what the outcome of sentencing would be? 
MR. DURAN: Only for that 402 Motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. You understand that's not a 
premise. That's just an attempt--
MR. DURAN: Right. 
THE COURT: Has anybody used any force or coercic 
or duress in any way to get you to enter into this plea 
today? 
MR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You are doing it of your own free wi 1 
and choice? 
MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you 
are, as a matter of fact, guilty? 
MR. DURAN: Yeah, I'm guilty. 
THE COURT: Any questions you want to ask the 
Court before we proceed? 
MR. DURAN: No, sir. 
THE COURT: What war, your involvement in this nr 
just the part of Count Two? 



























THE COURT: Oh, what was taken? 
MR. DURAN: From the car? 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Theft, a felony 







It's a car? 
Right. 




MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Both of ycu did it together; is that 
MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Where were you going to go with the 
MR. DURAN: Out to Bountiful. 
THE COURT: Where did you take the car, from what 
city? 
MR. DURAN: Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you still want to enter a 
plea of guilty in the matter? 
MR. DURAN: Yes, sir. 



























felony of the second degree, theft, do you want your plea 
entered as guilty or not guilty? 
MR. DURAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Court will accept the guilty plea and 
order the charge in Count One to be dismissed. Is it 
agreeable we set sentencing for August 24th at 1:30? 
MR. JOKES: Very much so, Judge. 
MR. DURAN: Sir, I have cot a sentencing on Augurt 
18 in Salt Lake City. Would that be of any problem tc 
either court? 
THE COURT: Ho. No problem. 
MR. DURAN: They can still go with that? 
THE COURT: Yes. No problem. We will probably 
have a probation officer that will be checking with you to 
see what the sentence was, but other than that, there's no 
problem. Thank you. We will be in recess for five minutes. 
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IN TOE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK ANTHONY DURAN, 
a.k.a. MARK ANTHONY BRESQKO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 940700319 HC 
Recently, the Court has received various communications from plaintiff Mark 
Anthony Duran, a.k.a. Mark Anthony Bresqko. The Court has received 2 letters, a pleading 
entitled "Motion for Extension of Time to File All Future Motions in this Com! (Motion for 
Extension of Time")," and a pleading entitled "Response to Courts Motion to Deny or 
Dismiss Petition on Grounds of Frivolous ("Response11)." The Court's clerk has also 
received several telephone calls from an individual claiming to be defendant's cousin. 
Several months ago the Com! received a letter from defendant claiming to inquire into 
the status of his case, and asking if the Court had issued a ailing. In response, the Court sent 
defendant a copy of its "Ruling on Petition for Extraordinary Relief," which had been issued 
and previously sent to him October 26, 1994. Defendant, in his letter's and in his Response, 
infomis the Court that he is known in the Colorado prison where he is now being incarcerated 
by the name "Mark Anthony Bresqko," rather than "Mark Anthony Duran." He claims that 
the prison's policy is to deliver only correctly addressed mail to inmates, and that this policy 
prevented his timely reception of the Court's October 26, 1994 Riling. 
The time for appeal now having long since expired, defendant wishes to have the 
Court reopen the case and revisit its prior ruling. Apart from there being no procedural basis 
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for a "Response" to a ruling by the Court, defendant has submitted no new evidence that may 
in any way justify such action. Nevertheless, the Court understands the procedural problems 
faced by his alleged non-reception of the Court's October 26, 1994 ruling. Therefore, the 
Court would today reissue the ruling to enable defendant's timely appeal. The ruling, in its 
entirety, is thus: 
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Petition for Post Conviction Relief to 
Vacate Conviction, corresponding Memorandum of Authority, and the other 
documents on file with the Court. Having done so, and now being fully 
advised, the Court finds pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65(b)(7) 
that said petition is frivolous on its face and denies the same. See State v. 
Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) ("By pleading guilty, defendant is 
deemed to have admitted all essential elements of the crime charged and 
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects."); see also Pasqual v. Carver. 240 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1994) ("Allegations of error cannot be pursued for 
the first time by writ of habeas corpus if they could have been raised on direct 
appeal."); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994) ("The writ can 
neither be a substitute for, nor perform the function of, regular appellate 
review"). 
Furthermore, because the Court rules that this Court's final decision has been made, 
the Court would deny defendant's Motion for Extension of Time. 
34 
Dated July 14, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-401 
Unloaded firearm. 1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P2d 1375 (Utah 
Aggravated robbery may be committed with 1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989); 
387 (Utah 1977). State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990); 
„, , . o ^ • „ ,o O O J o,o ,TT. u State v. Severance, 828 P2d 1066 (Utah Ct. 
• ™
e t m S t a t l V ' T 0 r t l 2 ' ^ o 2 i o A 1)1 J ^ K APP-1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. 1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
 A ~ 1 Q ' ' 
,1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah A p p ' i y ^ * 
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3. Admissibility of expert opinion stating 
CJ.S. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27. whether a particular knife was, or could have 
AX.R. — Fact that gun was unloaded as been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 660. 




For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
191 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-404 
court properly refused to give an instruction 
proffered by defendant. State v. Larsen, 876 
P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Pleading and practice. 
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of 
theft" required to be pled by this section to 
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft. 
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with 
the general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404, 
it may then present its evidence to prove the 
theft was committed in any manner specified in 
§§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745 
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen 
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of theft without the necessity 
of establishing thefl by taking. State v. Taylor, 
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits thefl if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
cial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq. 
Shopiiaing Act, § 78-11-14 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Bailments. 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Corpus delicti. 
Elements of offense. 
Evidence. 





Pleading and practice. 
Possession of recently stolen property. 






Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own 
property, if done with intent to charge bailee. 
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 
(1943). 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Where defendant charged with theft of build-
ing materials from construction site did not 
testify in his own defense and offered no evi-
dence to explain his late-night presence at the 
site, prosecutor's comment that: 'The defense 
has presented no evidence as to why defendant 
was out there. What was he doing out there?" 
was a legitimate comment on what the total 
evidence did or did not show; it was not imper-
missible comment on defendant's failure to tes-
tify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). 
Corpus delicti. 
In prosecution for larceny it was not essential 
that corpus delicti be established by evidence 
independent of that adduced to prove that de-
fendant was perpetrator of crime; the same 
evidence could be used to prove both. State v. 
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd 
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494 
(1944). 
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of 
the elements that one entitled to possession of 
the property has been deprived of possession 
and such deprivation has been accomplished by 
a felonious taking; evidence of the property 
having been taken from the possession of the 
owner without his knowledge or consent is 
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus 
delicti. State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1980). 
Elements of offense. 
State is not required to prove conclusively 
who the real owner of the property is, but only 
that defendant obtained or exercised unautho-
rized control over the property of another. State 
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977). 
This section requires a finding of only one of 
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unau-
thorized control" over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; convic-
tion for thefl can be upheld without a finding 
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long 
as there is a finding that he "exercised unau-
thorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649 
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence. 
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State 
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76-6-411 CRIMINAL CODE 
demands by owner, court, sitting without a jury, viation" has the common sense meaning of 
was not required to believe defendant's testi- being an extreme deviation. State v. Owens, 
mony that he gave typewriter to his business 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981). 
partners to return, since partners were not 
called to corroborate his story, and defendant Use related to purpose of agreement. 
conveniently forgot important details. State v. Subsection (1) assumes that the property 
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966).
 m a v be used by the custodian for purposes 
Evidence supported conviction of embezzle-
 pr0perly related to the purpose of the entrust-
ment, where defendant had been given permis-
 m e n t ; only a use that constitutes "a gross 
sion to continue to use car on somewhat open- deviation from the agreed purpose," without 
ended contract after initial rental period had
 e x p r e s s consent for personal use, is a crime, 
expired but defendant failed to return car on
 S u t e v D i r k e r . 6 1 0 R 2 d 1 2 7 5 ( U t a h 1 9 8 0 ) 
specific date on which he was finally told that 
he must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d Cited in State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah 
309, 489 P.2d 107 (1971). Ct. App. 1988). 
"Gross deviation." 
As used in this section, the term "gross de-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 89. Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 15. 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46,47. 
76-6-411. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by tion of property subject to legal obligation, was 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411, relating to theft by repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41. 
failure to make required payment or disposi-
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 




NOTES TO DECISIONS 
tton on appeal of the purportedly preserved 
issue would not have necessarily ended the 
prosecution of the case State v Montoya, 858 
P2d 1027 (Utah Ct App 1993). 
Cited in State v. Sery, 758 P2d 935 (Utah Ct 
App 1988). 
77-13-4. Felonies — Entry in open court. 
All pleas in felony cases shall be entered by the defendant in open court and 
the proceedings recorded. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-13-5. Failure to plead — Not guilty entered. 
When a defendant does not enter a plea, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty for him. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Waiver. going to trial State v Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 
One accused of crime could waive mere for- P 271 (1918) 
mahty of entering plea of not guilty before 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21A Am Jur 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 C J.S Criminal Law § 378 
Law § 447 Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <$= 266. 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch. ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Rule 






Trial court should not have accepted a condi-
tional no contest plea since a favorable resolu-
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